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Abstract
We propose a new framework for bargaining in which the process
follows an agenda. The agenda is represented by a family, parameter-
ized by time, of increasing sets of joint utilities for possible agreements.
This is in contrast to the single set used in the standard framework.
The set at each time involves all possible agreements on the issues dis-
cussed up to that time. A bargaining solution for an agenda species
a path of agreements, one for each time. We characterize axiomat-
ically a solution that is ordinal, meaning that it is covariant with
order-preserving transformations of the utility representations. It can
be viewed as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining process in which
the agreement point of the last negotiation becomes the disagreement
point for the next. The stepwise agreements may follow the Nash
solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution or many others, and the or-
dinal solution will still emerge as the steps tend to zero. Shapley
showed that ordinal solutions exist for the standard framework for
three players but not for two; the present framework generates an
ordinal solution for any number of bargainers, in particular for two.
1 Introduction
Nash's pioneering paper on two-person bargaining, (1950), has led to two
streams of research. One develops axiomatizations leading to Nash's solution
or to later ones, while the second constructs plausible non-cooperative games
behind the bargaining problem, then solves these games. Less attention
has been paid to expanding the denition of what constitutes a bargaining
problem.
1This paper looks at bargaining as extended over time. Our primitive is a
family of bargaining problems (each of which is a set of feasible agreements),
rather than a single one as in Nash's conception. We refer to such a fam-
ily of feasible sets as an agenda. A gradual bargaining problem is dened
by its agenda and an initial point at which the bargaining starts. For clar-
ity and simplicity we will consider a family of feasible sets that is ordered
continuously by time.
Whereas a solution to a Nash bargaining problem species a single agree-
ment, a solution for a gradual bargaining is a path of agreements { a gradual
agreement { which species an agreement point for each point in time. We
propose a solution for gradual bargaining, namely, a function that assigns to
each gradual bargaining problem a certain gradual agreement. We call this
solution for a reason that should become clear, the ordinal solution.
Our model is meant to capture situations in which the parties are to reach
agreements on several issues negotiated one after the other. These issues can
have a natural order as is the case in labor contracts signed annually, or
the division of prots determined at the end of each quarter. Alternatively,
the issues can be ordered by the bargainers, as in a negotiation to end a
political con
ict in which territorial, economic and other issues are negotiated
sequentially. In each of these cases, the possible agreements at each stage
of the bargaining process cover all the issues raised until this stage. Thus,
for example, in a case of prot sharing the possible agreements at a certain
stage are all the possible sharing arrangements of the prot accumulated up
to this stage.
Our framework views the agreement reached at each stage as nal for
the issues on the table up to that time. This assumption is expressed in our
axiomatic characterization by the time consistency axiom. It requires that
taking the agreement reached on the solution path at a given point in time
and applying the solution rule to the same agenda with this agreement as
an initial point yields the continuation of that same path. The assumption
on the bargaining process also underlies the description of the ordinal solu-
tion as the limit of a step-by-step bargaining which we discuss later in the
introduction.
The axiom of time consistency can be compared to the axiom of step-
by-step negotiation in Kalai (1977), which is used to characterize the family
of proportional solutions for Nash's bargaining problem. It considers that a
bargain can be concluded in two steps. The rst involves one with a smaller
feasible set and the same disagreement point as the entire problem, and
2the second step uses the solution of the rst as its new disagreement point.
Kalai's axiom requires that the same agreement be reached independently of
the choice of the feasible set in the rst stage, and so is much stronger than
ours. An axiom of agenda independence is also used by Ponsati and Watson
(1997) to characterize the Nash solution. In contrast to Kalai's and Ponsati
and Watson's axioms, our time independence axiom involves a given agenda.
The ordinal solution is characterized by ve axioms. The time consis-
tency axiom, which has already been discussed, is special to the gradual
bargaining setup. So also is a continuity requirement which depends on the
solution being a path of agreements. The other three axioms are analogous
to axioms commonly used for Nash's bargaining problem. We require that
the agreement reached at each point in time must be ecient in the set of
feasible utilities at that time. The solution of a symmetric problem must also
be symmetric. Further, the solution must be invariant under positive linear
transformations of a bargainer's utility.
The ordinal solution is described by a dierential equation that is sim-
ple to interpret: at each point on the agreement path the ratio of players'
marginal utility gains (with respect to time) is the rate of substitution of
their utilities on the current ecient frontier. Thus, using the marginal rate
of substitution to make an interpersonal comparison of utility, the gains of
solving the next stage of the negotiation are divided in egalitarian way.
The name of the proposed solution|the ordinal solution|is suggested
by the following two properties. First and most important, ordinality applies
to utility representation. The ordinal solution is covariant with respect to
order-preserving (i.e., monotonic) transformations of each bargainer's utility.
Ordinality also refers to time: the solution depends only on the order of the
agenda and not the precise timing of when issues are negotiated.
Invariance under order-preserving transformations is desirable for a solu-
tion, since it means that the solution is based on the most elementary aspect
of utility. Shapley (1969) demonstrated that the two-person Nash problem
has no single-valued solution satisfying symmetry, Pareto optimality, and
covariance under order-preserving transformations of the utility functions.
The three-person problem, however, has such a solution. The solution here
is ordinal for any number of players, and in particular for two players. The
intuition behind it is as follows. From the continuity and time covariance
axioms, the agreement reached at a certain time depends only on the local
behavior of the agenda. Thus, the solution is covariant under monotonic
transformations of the utilities that are locally linear. But every smooth
3monotonic transformation is, in an appropriate sense, locally linear.
The ordinal solution has an interesting relation to various solutions of
Nash's bargaining problem.
Suppose an agreement is reached at a certain time, and using this agree-
ment as a status quo point we solve the Nash bargaining problem with the
set of utilities that are feasible after some time increment. Suppose we solve
this problem using the Nash solution. It turns out that when the time incre-
ment approaches zero, the utility gains of the players per unit time converge
to those predicted by the ordinal solution. Thus, the ordinal solution is the
limit of a discrete process in which each agreement serve as a status quo
point for a Nash bargaining problem of the next stage, and the next agree-
ment is the Nash solution for this problem. Somewhat surprisingly, if in the
process described above we use the Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) solution
instead of the Nash solution, we also end up with the ordinal solution. In-
deed, any solution may be used as long as it coincides with the Nash solution
on linear problems1 and satises a certain continuity condition that allows
linearization of small feasible sets.
Section 2 formalizes the gradual bargaining problem, denes gradual
agreements and describes solutions to gradual bargaining problems. The
ordinal solution is introduced in Section 3 and axiomatized in Section 4.
Section 5 shows the two ordinal properties of the solution. The relation of
the gradual solution to other concepts in the Nash bargaining framework is
in Section 6. Finally, the proofs appear in Section 7.
Continuous time processes in the context of the Nash bargaining model
were used among others by the following authors. Maschler, Owen and Peleg
(1988) characterized the Nash solution by means of a system of dieren-
tial equations and interpreted the solution as a continuous process of mov-
ing within the feasible set of utilities. Livne (1989) and Peters and van
Damme (1993) used a similar approach to characterize the continuous ver-
sion of Raia's solution (Raia 1953). Zhou (1997) used a dierential equa-
tion to extend the Nash solution to non-convex problems. In all these works
bargaining is described by Nash bargaining problem, that is a single set of
feasible utilities, and not as a family of Nash bargaining problems as here.
Related papers studied discrete bargaining with multiple pies: Fershtman
(1990) and John and Raith (1997) in a bilateral context, and Winter (1997)
1This is the case when the solution is ecient, symmetric and covariant with respect
to linear transformations of utilities.
4and Seidmann and Winter (1997) in a multilateral context. Nicol o and Perea
(2000) oered a dierent model of two-person bargaining that also leads to
an ordinal solution.
Bergman (1992) studied two-person non-cooperative bargaining over a
shrinking pie, described by a family of Pareto surfaces (see also Binmore
(1987)). He developed a dierential equation that corresponds to our solu-
tion in the special case of two players, by taking the continuous time limit of
the alternating oer bargaining game. In contrast, we motivate the ordinal
solution axiomatically and by considering step-by-step cooperative bargain-
ing.
In this paper the bargaining agenda is given exogenously. However a
few authors studied the choice of agenda itself as a non-cooperative bargain-
ing problem. An agenda in these studies is typically a nite set of issues.
Negotiations are modeled as non-cooperative extensive form games and the
results mainly concern the comparison of agendas (the ordering of issues) in
terms of their prospects of yielding ecient outcomes. Examples are Fersht-
man (1990) and John and Raith (1997) in bilateral negotiations, and Winter
(1997) in a multilateral framework. Thomson (1994) gives a concise survey
of bargaining models derived from Nash's axioimatic approach, including
Shapley's ordinal solution.
2 Gradual bargaining
2.1 Gradual bargaining problems
Consider a nite set N of n players. A gradual bargaining problem is one in
which they negotiate the issues one after another. In term of utilities, it is
described by feasible sets that expand over time. For each time t the set in
t is the subset of utilities in RN that correspond to possible agreements on
the issued negotiated until t.
In our continuous time model the expanding feasible sets are described
by an increasing function f on RN, the value of which is time. The set
fx 2 RN j f(x)  tg is the set of utility vectors of possible agreements on
issues negotiable up to time t.
Denition 1 An agenda is a real-valued function f on RN. The agenda
f denes for each time t the feasible set S
f
t = fx 2 RN j f(x)  tg. We
assume that f satises the following conditions.
51. f is continuously dierentiable.
2. rf > 0.
3. rf is locally Lipschitz, i.e, for each bounded subset of RN there is
a constant K, such that for each x and y in the subset, jjrf(x)  
rf(y)jj < Kjjx   yjj.
We denote by F the set of all agendas. By the strict monotonicity of f








Denition 2 A gradual bargaining problem (or problem, for short) is
a pair (f;a), in F RN, of an agenda f and an initial (status quo) point
a.
2.2 Solutions
A gradual bargaining problem results in interim agreements, one for each
point in time t, which are given as n-tuples of utilities. A specication of
these agreements is called a gradual agreement.
Denition 3 A gradual agreement  is a continuously dierentiable path
in RN, :R ! RN.
For each time t, (t) is the vector of utilities determined by the interim
agreement at time t. The set of all gradual agreements is denoted by P.2
Denition 4 A solution for gradual bargaining problems is a function
 : F  R
N ! P;
such that for each problem (f;a), the gradual agreement  = (f;a) is feasible
at each time, that is, f((t))  t, for all t.
2We assume for simplicity that a gradual agreement species agreement points even
for times prior to the time of the initial point. Starting from any of these agreements as
a status quo point would have led to the initial agreement point.
63 The ordinal solution
The ordinal solution is determined by a dierential equation. In Section 4
we characterize this equation axiomatically, but here we outline a derivation
of it by reducing the solution of a gradual bargaining problem to the solution
of a sequence of Nash bargaining problems.
Equipped with a solution for Nash bargaining problems, one may ap-
proach a gradual bargaining as follows. At each stage solve the Nash bargain-
ing problem that consists of the feasible set at this stage with the agreement
of the previous stage as a status quo point. In our continuous setup, where
there is no \previous" stage, we require an appropriate limit process, which
we describe next.
Suppose that at time t an ecient agreement x is reached for the agenda
f. Thus, f(x) = t. Consider the Nash bargaining problem that consists
of the status quo point x, and the feasible set at time t + t, that is, the
set fy j f(y)  t + tg. An ecient solution for this Nash bargaining
problem is a point y = x + x on the Pareto frontier of the feasible set,
that is f(x + x) = t + t. For the left hand side we take the rst order
approximation f(x) +
P
i fixi, where the fi's are the partial derivatives of
f at x. Using this approximation, the requirement that x + x is on the
frontier is given by
P
i fixi = t.
Suppose we apply the Nash solution to this problem. Then, x is the
maximizer of the function h(x) =
Q
i xi subject to
P
i fixi = t. This
constrained optimization problem is solved by the vector x that satises
for some  (the Lagrangian multiplier of the constraint) hi = fi, for each
i. As hi = h=xi, we conclude that xi = (h=)(1=fi). Substituting the
right hand side in the constraint, we nd that h= = t=n. Thus, for each
i, xi = t=(nfi). This leads to the dierential equation described next.
As we see in Section 6 the same dierential equation results if we use the
Kalai-Smorodinsky solution rather than the Nash solution. Moreover any
solution that coincides with these solutions on linear bargaining problems
and satises a simple continuity property gives rise to the same equation.
Denition 5 The ordinal solution for gradual bargaining problems asso-
ciates with each problem (f;a) the unique gradual agreement  that solves
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7with the initial condition (f(a)) = a.
By condition 2 in Denition 1, the right hand side of (1) is well dened.











Since I is Lipschitz on any domain that is bounded away from 0, it follows by
condition 2 that the right hand side of (1) is locally Lipschitz. It then follows
from conditions 1 and 3, that (1) has a unique solution (see for example
Hartman (1982)).
We show later that for each t, f((t)) = t. That is, the agreement at
time t belongs to the Pareto frontier of S
f
t , the feasible set at t. In light of
this, the interpretation of the ordinal solution is straightforward. The ratio
of players i's and j's marginal increments of utility at time t, 0
i(t)=0
j(t),
is, according to (1), the marginal rate of substitution of i's and j's utilities
at (t) along the Pareto frontier of S
f
t . Thus the ordinal solution equates
players' gains according to the appropriate substitution rate of their utilities.
4 Axiomatic characterization
We now consider a set of axioms that characterize the ordinal solution. The
rst three are analogous to axioms in many characterizations of solutions of
Nash bargaining problems.
We require rst that no feasible outcome at time t dominate the agreement
point at t.
Axiom 1 (Eciency) For each t, if x > (f;a)(t), then f(x) > t.
Since the Pareto surface of the S
f
t is fx j f(x) = tg, and since solutions are
required to be feasible, this axiom is equivalent to requiring that for each t,
f((f;a)(t)) = t.
The next axiom corresponds to the standard symmetry condition used for
several solutions of Nash's problem. For a permutation of N, :N ! N and
x = (xi)i2N in RN, we denote x = (x(i))i2N. A problem (f;a) is symmetric
if for any permutation  and x 2 RN, f(x) = f(x) and a = (a) (i.e., all
coordinates of a are the same.)
8Axiom 2 (Symmetry) If (f;a) is symmetric, then for each t, (f;a)(t) is
symmetric, i.e., all its coordinates are the same.
The following axiom requires that the solution be covariant with respect
to positive linear transformations of utility. Let s = (si)i2N be a vector of
linear transformations of R. For x in RN, we denote s(x) = (si(xi))i2N. For
each function f on RN, the function fs is dened by (fs)(x) = f(s(x)).
Consider two bargaining problems (g;b) and (f;a), the rst formulated in
terms of the utilities before the transformation s and the second in utilities
after the transformation. That is, fs = g, and a = s(b). The covariance
axiom requires that the solution of (f;a) be the one obtained by applying
the transformation s to the solution of (g;b).
Axiom 3 (Covariance) Let s = (si)i2N be a vector of linear transforma-
tions. If for the pair of problems (f;a) and (g;b), g = fs, and a = s(b), then
(f;a) = s((g;b)).
The next two axioms are special to the gradual bargaining context. The
rst expresses the essence of gradual bargaining: bargaining restarts at each
point in time with the \last" agreement serving as a status quo point. The
axiom requires that taking any of the interim agreements as the initial status
quo results in the same path of agreements.
Axiom 4 (Time consistency) If (f;a)(t) = x, then (f;x) = (f;a)
Next we require that the solution be continuous in the following sense. If
the agendas in the two problems (f,a) and (g,a) are close in a neighborhood
of a, then the rates of utility gains at a for these two problems are also
close. Closeness of the agendas f and g in a bounded neighborhood B of a
is dened by the metric dB on the set of agendas F, such that dB(f;g) =
supx2B jjrf(x)   rg(x)jj.




is continuous with respect to the metric dB on F .
Theorem 1 The ordinal solution is the unique solution that satises axioms
1-5. Furthermore, these axioms are independent.
95 Ordinality
We justify the name of the solution by showing that it is ordinal with respect
to both utilities and time.
The rst property considerably strengthens the covariance axiom by re-
quiring that the solution be covariant not only with linear transformations
of utility, but with monotonic transformations of utility. The notation is the
same as used above for the covariance axiom.
Property 1 (Utility ordinality) Let s = (si)i2N be a vector of strictly
increasing transformations of R. If for the pair of problems (f;a) and (g;b),
g = fs, and a = s(b), then (f;a) = s((g;b)).
Feasible sets of utility, S
f
t , as well as agreements along the solution path
have been parameterized here by time. The next property says that only the
order of the feasible sets and agreements matters, not their precise timing. To
formulate this exactly, consider a time transformation, which is simply an
increasing function :R ! R. When time is transformed by , agendas and
gradual agreements change correspondingly. The agenda f is represented,
after the transformation, by f, which is dened by (f)(x) = (f(x)).
Similarly, a gradual solution  is represented by  which is dened by
()(t) = ((t)).
Property 2 (time ordinalilty) Let f be an agenda, and  a time trans-
formation. If f is an agenda and  = (f;a) then (f;a) = .
Theorem 2 The ordinal solution satises the properties of utility ordinality
and time ordinalilty.
6 Gradual and one-shot bargaining
A one-shot bargaining problem is a pair (S;d), where S, the feasible set, is
a subset of RN, and d, the status quo (or disagreement point), is a point in
S. Let D be a set of one-shot bargaining problems. A solution for D is a
function  : D ! RN, such that for each problem (S;d) 2 D, (S;d) 2 S.
An agenda denes a continuum of feasible sets. We are interested in
agendas for which any of these sets, in combination with a disagreement
point, belongs to the domain D over which  is dened.





t ;d) 2 D:
A gradual agreement can be thought of as the limit of agreements achieved
in discrete time when the time intervals between agreements tend to zero.
Let  be a gradual agreement, and (t) be the interim agreement at time t.
Suppose the next agreement is reached at time t0 > t. The feasible set at time
t0 is S
f
t0, and the status quo point is the most recent agreement (t). Applying
the solution  to this one-shot bargaining problems results in the agreement
(S
f
t0;(t)). Dividing the utility gains of this agreement, (S
f
t0;(t))   (t),
by the elapsed time t0   t yields the rate of change in utility gains. If the
limit of this rate, when t0 converges to t, is 0(t), for each t, then we say
the gradual agreement  is compatible with the solution . The following
denition formalizes the idea that a gradual solution  is compatible with a
solution  for one-shot bargaining problems in the way just described.
Denition 7 Let  be a solution on D, and  be a solution for gradual
bargaining problems. We say that  is compatible with  if for each agenda
f that is compatible with D, and for each a, the gradual agreement  =









Theorem 3 The ordinal solution is compatible with the Nash and the Kalai-
Smorodinsky solutions.
Thus the rate of utility gains in the ordinal solution is the limit of the
rate of gains for small problems using each agreement as the status quo for
the next bargain and applying either the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky
solutions.
We now consider two properties of a solution  of one-shot bargaining
problems that guarantee that the ordinal solution be compatible with .
The Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions have these properties, and
this fact explains why both induce the same gradual solution.
A problem (S;d) is linear if S is of the form fx j c(x d)  
g, for some
c > 0 in RN and positive real number 
. We assume that the domain of
, D, contains all linear problems. The rst property concerns solutions for
linear bargaining problems.
11Property 1 (Solutions for linear problems) If S = fx j c(x   d)  
g,
then (S;d)   d = 
I(nc).
This property is possessed by any solution that is ecient, symmetric and
covariant with respect to linear transformation of utility, such as the Nash
and the Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions.
The next property concerns the approximation of bargaining problems
by linear problems. Consider an agenda f that is compatible with D, and
a problem (S
f
t0;d). Let f(d) = t, and note that S
f
t0 = fx j f(x)   f(d) 
t0   tg. We approximate (S
f
t0;d) by the linear problem (^ S
f
t0;d) where ^ S
f
t0 =
fx j (rf)(d)(x   d)  t0   tg.
Property 2 (Linear approximation) Let f be an agenda that is compat-














Proposition 1 The ordinal solution is compatible with any solution  sat-
isfying Properties 1 and 2.
The proof of this proposition is straightforward. If a solution  satises
Property 1 then (^ S
f
t0;d)   d = (t0   t)I((nrf)(d)). Therefore, Property 2
is equivalent, in this case, to requiring that the ordinal solution is compat-
ible with . In particular, as the Nash and the Kalai-Smorodinsky satisfy
Property 1, it follows by Theorem 3 that they satisfy Property 2.
7 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. Let  be the ordinal solution. To see that it is
ecient, let  = (f;a), and denote (t) = f((t)). Then, by (1) 0(t) =
P
i2N @f=@xi((t))0
i(t) = 1: Also, (f(a)) = f((f(a))) = f(a). Therefore
(t) = t.
Next we show that  satises the ordinal utility axiom, which is stronger
than the covariance axiom. Assume that (f;a) and (g;b) are as described
in the ordinal utility axiom. Since g = fs, it follows that si is continuously
dierentiable for each i. Let   = (g;b). We need to show that  = s 




















with the initial condition  (g(b)) = b. Multiplying both sides of the dieren-
tial equation by (dsi=dxi)( i(t)) shows that  = s  solves (1) for (f;a) with
the initial condition (f(a) = s (f(s(b)) = s (g(b)) = s(b) = a.
To see why the consistency axiom is satised, note that the dierential
equations for (f;a) and (f;x) dier only in the initial condition. Suppose that
for  = (f;a), (t) = x. Since the ordinal solution is ecient, f(x) = t.
It is enough to show that  satises the initial condition of (1) for (f;x).
Indeed, (f(x)) = (t) = x.
It is easy to see that the ordinal solution satises the axioms of symmetry
and continuity.
Conversely, let  be a solution that satises axioms 1-5. We show that it
is the ordinal solution.
(a) If  2 RN is symmetric and has positive coordinates, and  is a solu-
tion that satises the symmetry and eciency axioms, then for the linear
function h(x) = x+c, where x is the scalar product and c a real number,
0(h;0)(h(0)) = I(n)
Indeed, h is a symmetric agenda, and thus (h;0) is symmetric. Fix
t, and let (h;0)(t) = (x;:::;x). By eciency, h(x;:::;x) = t. Thus,
x = t(n1) 1. Hence, 0(h;0)(t) = I(n) for all t, and in particular this
holds for t = h(0).
(b) Let g be an agenda for which rg(0) is symmetric. If  is a solu-















To show this we need to use the continuity axiom. Fix a neighborhood B of
a and " > 0. By the continuity of  at (h;0), there exists  > 0 such that if
for each i 2 N, and x 2 B,
j(@f=@xi)(x)   (@h=@xi)(x)j   (3)
13then j0(f;0)(f(0))   0(h;0)(h(0))j  ".
We construct an agenda f that satises (3) and coincides with g in some
neighborhood of a. By the continuity axiom 0(f;0)(f(0)) = 0(g;0)(g(0)).
Therefore j0(g;0)(g(0)) 0(h;0)(h(0))j  ". Since this is true for arbitrary
", the required equality is established.
To complete the proof of (b) we construct the agenda f. Let q be a
continuously dierentiable function on R such that 0  q  1, q(r) = 0 for
each r  0, and q(r) = 1 for each r  1. Let M be a uniform bound on jq0j
such that M  1.
Choose c > 0 such that for each jjxjj  2c, j(@g=@xi)(x) (@g=@xi)(0)j 
=(4nM), for each i 2 N. Consider the function
f(x) =

1   q(jjxjj=c   1)

g(x) + q(jjxjj=c   1)h(x):
Then, f(x)   h(x) =





. By the denition of
q, f coincides with g for jjxjj  c and with h for jjxjj  2c.
We evaluate the size of the terms on the left hand side of this equality, as
well as the derivatives of these terms. It is enough to consider only jjxjj  2c,













































Also, j1   q(jjxjj=c   1)j  1. Finally, since g(0)   h(0) = 0, jg(x)   h(x)j =























This completes the proof of (b).
(c) If  satises the axioms of symmetry, eciency, continuity, and covari-





14For each i 2 N, dene a linear transformation













It is easy to check that
rg(0) = (1;:::;1); (6)






































(d) If  satises axioms 1-5, and  = (f;a), then  satises (1).
Let (t) = x. By eciency, f(x) = t. By (c), 0(f;x)(f(x)) = I(nrf(x)).
By the consistency axiom (f;x) = (f;a), and therefore 0(f(x)) = I(nrf(x)).
Substituting t for f(x) in the left hand side, and (t) for x in the right hand
side yields (1).
To prove the independence of the axioms, we provide for each a solution
that violates it but satises the rest. Details are omitted.
Eciency. Let  be the ordinal solution. Fix a real number c > 0, and
dene a solution 	 by 	(f;a)(t) = (f;a)(t   c). Since the derivative of 
is positive, it is strictly increasing. Thus, f(	(f;a)(t)) < f((f;a)(t)) = t,
and 	 does not satisfy eciency.
Covariance. Let g(x) = f(x;:::;x). Dene a solution 	 by 	(f;a)(t) =
(g 1(t);:::;g 1(t)). Obviously 	 is a solution, and it is easy to see that it
satises all axioms but covariance.
15Symmetry. Let w = fwigi2N be a set of non-negative numbers (weights)
such that
P




@xi((t)) 1 with initial conditions (f(a)) = a. Then, by
applying w to the problem (f;0), where f(x) =
P
i2N xi, it is easy to see
that it satises the symmetry axiom if and only if wi = 1 for each i. All
other axioms are satised by w for each w.
Continuity. Fix a non-symmetric weight vector w. Consider a solution that
coincides with the ordinal solution for each problem (f;a) if there exists a
monotonic transformation s, as in the axiom of ordinal utility, such that fs
is a symmetric function. For all other problems (and there are indeed such
problems) the solution is represented by w. This solution satises all axioms
but continuity.
Consistency. Dene a solution 	 such that for each problem (f;a) and
time t, 	(f;a)(t) is the Nash solution for the one-shot problem (S
f
t ;a).
Proof of Theorem 2. In the proof of Theorem 1 we showed that the ordinal
solution satises the ordinal utility axiom.
Let f be an agenda, and  an increasing real valued function such that
f is also an agenda. Then,  must be dierentiable. Denote g = f, and
let  = (g;a).
We show that  (t) = ((t)) solves (1) for f. Note that for each t,





















Also,  (f(a)) = ((f(a))) = (( 1(g(a)))) = a.
Proof of Theorem 3. Consider an agenda f and a point d such that
f(d) = t.
We rst examine the case that  is the Nash solution. For t0 > t, (S
f
t0;d)
is the point x at which the function g(y) = n
i=1(yi  di) attains a maximum
on S
f
t0. At the point x, f(x) = t0, and the direction of the gradients of g and
f coincide. As the gradient of g at x is g(x)I(x   d), it follows that x   d
16is in the same direction as I(rf(x)). Hence, there is an  = (t0) such that
x = d+I(rf(x)). Therefore f(d+I(rf(x))) f(d) = t0 t. We conclude
that rf(d)I(rf(x)) + o(t0   t) = t0   t. As rf(x) !t0#t rf(d), it follows




0   t) = I(rf(x))=(t
0   t) !t0#t I(nrf(d)));
which establishes (2) for the ordinal solution.
Assume now that  is the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution. For each i, let bi
be the number that satises
f(d + biei) = t
0; (8)
where ei is a unit vector along the i axis. Let b =
P
i2N biei. Then (S
f
t0;d) is
the point on the ecient frontier of S
f
t in the direction b from d. Therefore,
(S
f
t0;d)   d = b for some number , such that
f(d + b) = t
0: (9)
By (8), f(d+biei) f(d) = t0 t, and therefore bi(@f=@xi)(d)+o(t0 t) =
t0   t. Hence, b !t0#t I(rf(d)).
By (9), f(d+b) f(d) = t0 t, and therefore, rf(d)b+o(t0 t) = t0 t.
Hence, =(t0  t) !t0#t 1=n. Finally, [(S
f
t0;d) d]=(t0  t) = b=(t0  t) !t0#t
I(nrf(d))); as was to be to shown.
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